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Abstract: Given the coterie of philosophers focused on everyday aesthetics, it’s
fascinating that gift reception has heretofore managed to escape their scrutiny. To
enact a gift, recipients begin by imagining its use. Enacting a gift is thus a kind
of performance, whose value depends on the donee’s interpretation, just as exhibi-
tions, concerts, staged plays or books are performances of visual art, scores, scripts
or texts, whose interpretations demonstrate their aesthetic value. To develop the
relationship between enacting gifts and performing artworks, I begin by surveying
junctures along the gift-event’s arc: reply, imagination, trust, recognition, trans-
formation and memory. Transformations arising from agonistic gifts strike me as
significant because they characterise the way gifts challenge our beliefs, eventu-
ally altering our values. That we grow to love gifts, which we originally rejected
out of hand, casts doubt on self-knowledge. Enacted gifts handily challenge self-
knowledge’s twin features: authority and transparency. As this paper indicates,
gift reception helps both to understand ourselves better and to remove the obstacles
to what Quassim Cassim calls Substantive Self-Knowledge.
I. ENACTING THE GIFT
What you are regarding as a gift is a problem for you to solve.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, 1943.1
In praising the giver’s greatness, Marcel Mauss stressed the giver’s intention,
yet neglected reception, thus failing to accord recipients agency. Even peo-
ple who instantly enumerate the many horrible gifts they’ve received over
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the years rarely abandon gift-giving, since even ‘bad’ gifts avow alliances.
One obvious exception includes those who feel obliged to ‘up the ante’ with
countergifts destined to ‘crush the giver’. Although anthropologists describe
ceremonial reciprocal gifts that pose a challenge to recipients as ‘agonistic’,
such practices are more ‘pacts of recognition’ than ‘gift-warfare’.2 In the
2020 English translation of Le don de philosophes: Repenser la réciprocité,
Marcel Hénaff argues that philosophers who consider gift exchange to an-
nul the ‘gift’ have overlooked what gifts achieve: they foster social bonds
and formalise interpersonal relationships.3 This paper employs his research
to demonstrate how unexpected gifts challenge self-knowledge and alter our
beliefs. It’s rather fascinating that gift reception has largely escaped philoso-
phers focused on everyday aesthetics. With scores of books addressing gift
giving as an art, givers recall John Dewey’s producers, making gift recipients
his ‘appreciative, perceiving and enjoying’ consumers. This is not only ev-
eryday aesthetics’ standpoint, but those gifts we especially appreciate have
aesthetic value on par with everyday aesthetics’ ordinary things.
I’m focused here on those presents that seem to mispresent our prefer-
ences, those startling things we’ve all received, whether as birthday gifts,
hospitality treats, friendship mementos, collegial gestures or quiet favours.
Hardly meant as bribes, such ‘unmotivated’ gifts are simply kind gestures,
whose sole purpose is to complement our assessed interests, particular taste,
physical traits, professional access and special capacities. I use the word ‘com-
plement’ to suggest that even gifts intended as a match can pose a challenge
on par with ceremonial reciprocal gifts. Gifts that mispresent are certainly
not meant to wield power over us or harm recipients in any way, since that
would nullify the gift. However, demanding gifts (wanted or not) boost our
capacities and facilitate access, thus enhancing our wellbeing.4 Suppose a
guy with hazel eyes receives an ‘eye-popping’ loden jumper. Unaware of his
anti-hunting sentiments, the giver carefully selected it to match his eyes.5
Every time he tries it on, he looks in the mirror, shakes his head ‘No way’
and grabs his patched-up blue cardigan instead.
Perhaps gifts’ agonistic prospects are what prompt some to decry gifts as
‘horrible’. If you only ever buy blue clothes because blue is your favourite
colour and then someone hands you a loden jumper, you may feel largely
misunderstood, slightly cheated and possibly miserable. Having taken a risk,
the giver may also feel ‘powerless and [possibly] subjected to the threat of
rejection and aggression’.6 Needless to say, gifts launch asymmetrical events,
since they ‘throw us into what is yet to be’.7 Gifts point to future deeds.
For Hénaff, gifts prompt unpredictable replies, what he terms ‘alternating
dissymmetries’, which for him opens up the interplay of call and reply, rather
than annulling the gift as Jacques Derrida averred.8
To enact the gift, recipients begin by imagining its use. Presumably, the
hazel-eyed guy has survived his whole life without this ‘horrid’ jumper. Who
would wear a colour that conveys ‘murderer’? If the giver is trying to tell
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him something, why not just say what’s on his/her mind? Must he wear the
jumper just to please/appease the giver? Gifts inaugurate events that set
thoughts in motion, engendering unexpected consequences that spark/break
relationships. Gifts thus inspire recipients to evaluate, recognise and perhaps
one day appreciate their significance.
Gifts serve as litmus tests. In luring us, we’re taken out of our normal
ways of being to experience a different side of ourselves. For Emmanuel Lev-
inas, the Other is already given, what Edmund Husserl termed Gegebenheit
(givenness in English and le donné in French). On this level, both gifts and
art experiences, such as visits to Marcel Duchamp’s Étant donnés: 1° la chute
d’eau / 2° le gaz d’éclairage (Given: 1. The Waterfall, 2. The Illuminating
Gas) at the Philadelphia Museum of Art, exemplify the Other who ‘exists
before I say I’ and typically ‘take us away from the circle of the Same’, such
that we never return to the same spot again.9 Just as presented artworks
compel reception, the face of the Other summons us to reply, enabling every
I to give to or receive from the Other. Finally, ‘What is given. . . is offered
to be grasped’.10 Levinas adds, ‘Through its “transcendence”, the “giving-of-
itself” promises a possession and enjoyment, a satisfaction’.11 Gifts challenge
us to fulfil said promises.
Enacting a gift is thus a kind of performance, whose value depends on the
donee’s interpretation, just as exhibitions, concerts, staged plays or books
are performances of visual art, scores, scripts or texts, whose interpretations
demonstrate their aesthetic value. To develop the relationship between en-
acting gifts and performing artworks, I begin by surveying junctures along
the gift-event’s arc: reply, imagination, trust, recognition, transformation and
memory. Transformations arising from agonistic gift-relationships strike me
as significant because they characterise the way gifts challenge our beliefs,
eventually altering our values. Ever since the hazel-eyed guy mustered the
courage to wear his loden jumper, he’s received so many complements that
loden is now his go-to colour, a preference he could never have discovered
on his own. That we grow to love gifts that we initially rejected handily
challenges self-knowledge’s twin features: authority and transparency. Either
others know us better than we do ourselves or self-knowledge is subject to
change, which means it’s a belief that is not necessarily justifiable, let alone
true.
II. THE GIFT-EVENT’S ARC
To date, philosophers have tended to address such issues in terms of ‘giver-
oriented’ accounts such that ‘A gift is a giver-initiated action with benevolent
intent’. Giver-oriented accounts consider the giver’s action a gift, thus autho-
rising givers to assess whether their intentions count as benevolent. Problem
is, recipients have very different perspectives. Were the hazel-eyed guy asked
whether the giver’s intentions were benevolent, he would have good reason to
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deem them mean. Sometimes givers present gifts just to prompt a reply. In
order to resist such ploys, Jean-Paul Sartre considered the gift ‘gratuitous,
not motivated and disinterested’.12 As we shall see, givers prove powerless
in their capacity to seek replies, let alone establish a gift’s status; since only
the recipient can recognise the giver’s gesture as a gift. The deceptive giver’s
motives are thus easily defeated.
Derrida famously derided gifts as ‘the very figure of the impossible’.13 He
considered: ‘the gift another name [for] Being’, ‘absolute forgetting’ necessary
to avoid restitution and Es gibt (‘there is’) to ‘rest on the choice of an interpre-
tation’.14 Like artworks, we rarely take gifts at face value, since their utility
depends on some interpretation of its use. Givenness is simply the state of
something in our midst; already present, though not necessarily apparent or
appreciated, let alone grasped. Like artists, givers proffer reasons for their
gifts. For Derrida, ‘The gift is not a gift: the gift only gives to the extent
that it gives time’.15 And gifts do ‘give time’: 1) Presents spur memories of
a presently absent Other’s presence, 2) Treats save time spent shopping or
working to earn money, 3) Favours facilitate shortcuts, thus collapsing dis-
tances and accelerating time and 4) Gifts set events in motion, engendering
open-ended journeys that unfold over time.
Reply. Philosophers typically apply ‘reply’ to either the gift’s enactment,
some ‘countergift’ or the recipient’s singular response, all of which take time.
Thank you notes or words that articulate the gift’s significance remain even
farther afield. Is the gift the act of giving or acknowledgement of right action?
Must the gift be enacted to count as a gift? Who determines whether the
gesture is a gift (or a burden)? Historically, Trobiand Islanders practicing kula
arrived by canoe, displayed waigu’a (semi-precious objects) on the beach and
waited for the local chief to reciprocate.16 If no one showed up to accept their
bracelets and necklaces, they presumably loaded everything back in the boats
and sailed on to the next island with the wind knocked out of their sails. In
their role as givers, artists put their artworks out there, having no clue who
will respond to their efforts. By contrast, gifts, even artworks given as gifts,
are intended for particular recipients. The ‘call’ is intentional from the onset.
What I have in mind however are our spontaneous and immediate re-
actions (even if negative), what Levinas described as the I’s reply to some
Other’s call, since this sets the gift-event in motion. I interpret the Other’s
call as a gentle gesture meant to signal the I, which may or may not prompt
the I’s reply. For Levinas, ‘An object is given, but awaits us’. 17 ‘The passive
(given) becomes active (gives itself), which for Levinas means that it delivers
itself to be grasped’.18 And of course, unexpected gifts are no more readily
understood than unfamiliar artworks. Even if the hazel-eyed guy shoved his
new jumper under his bed and totally forgot about it until he wished he had
something to wear to a St. Patrick’s Day Party, his initial contempt set the
stage for what ensues. As Levinas notes, ‘Being in its presence offers itself to
a taking in hand, is a giving’.19 However, ‘this taking’ tends to take time, even
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when ‘the given’ has been under our nose all along (or under our bed). As we
shall see, giving’s pole is not reception, but grasping in terms of apprehension.
Truthfully, we recipients are under no obligation to reply, yet doing so
shows our face, thus keeping the dance alive. For Hénaff, ‘To fail to reply
is to give up the game’.20 Moreover, ‘When Others reply to us, they have
already been turned into others by what they have received, just as we become
others through their reply: In interpersonal relationships there is an essential
otherness; in the unfolding of time each of us becomes the Other’.21
So long as recipients are charged with appreciating gestures as gifts (or
not), the gift’s (in)significance cannot accrue to the giver. For Derrida, any
expectation of gratitude or reciprocity cancels the gift and nullifies its status,
leading him to demand ‘absolute forgetting’ on the giver’s part.22 For Hénaff,
the problem is the way obligatory replies, as opposed to spontaneous ones,
return recipients to the same spot, thus preventing adventures from unfolding.
In constraining givers, Derrida actually negates the autonomy of recipients,
whose ‘reply. . . restores the autonomy of the Others who face us and makes
us other than ourselves’.23 Thus, each recipient’s unique reply stands to move
the giver out of his/her ordinary conduct. That each subject’s being is always
in relation to another’s further complicates recipient agency.
In characterising the reply as a ‘fundamental indeterminacy’, Hénaff draws
yet another parallel between gifts and artworks.24 He credits the unpredictable
debt of reply with reversing the predictable debt of dependence, which frus-
trated those philosophers who failed to accord donees the driver’s seat.25
Derrida maintains, ‘For there to be a gift, it is necessary that the donee not
give back, amortise, reimburse, acquit himself, enter into contract, and that
he never have contracted a debt’.26 Hénaff counters: ‘[D]esire is a real move-
ment expressed by the act that carries us toward Others. But this act that
takes us away from the circle of the Same is not a mere decision we are free
to make or not make; it is compelled in us by the face of others, which calls
and summons us, unconditionally’.27
Just as the giver intends a gift for a particular person, the ‘I’ expresses
his/her uniqueness in his/her reply (and even by ‘ghosting’). Hénaff remarks,
‘As living beings and as embodiments of freedom they must reply to us;
they must uphold their names. The fact of their reply constitutes them as
others according to the very uniqueness recognised in them. Their reply can
only be unique, meant for us and no one else; only by its uniqueness does it
designate us just as uniquely as responsible toward them; this defines the Self
as nonsubstitutable’.28 ‘Passivity thus means primarily that the Self does not
constitute the foundation of things; the world is already there, and it is other
than us’.29 Finally, ‘the reply. . . moves us forward along the diachronic line;
but this is a bifurcating line’.30
We need not ascribe intentions to artists and gift-givers to see the similar-
ity between exhibiting artworks and presenting presents. Both parties take a
risk, though artists typically yearn for feedback, while gift-givers who await
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replies belie the profundity of gifts. When exhibited artworks fail to attract
reception (no reviews, no feedback. . . just totally ignored), an artist’s sense
of powerlessness resembles that of gift-givers who’ve risked outright rejection.
However, making and exhibiting artworks expose artists’ skills, ideas, tech-
niques, values and views to the whole world, not just one recipient at a time,
so artists’ sensitivities are hardly surprising. We don’t imagine gift-givers
feeling so vulnerable, since they knowingly take and accept the risk that their
gifts may end up being less popular than they’d hoped. Their satisfaction
stems more from the act of giving than some expected reply, otherwise anx-
ieties will arise between givers and recipients. Once the stakes become high,
the motion put in play by the gift can grind to a screeching halt. Similarly,
dissatisfied art lovers who actively listen, but fail to hear the call are tempted
to feel ‘largely misunderstood, slightly cheated, and possibly miserable’, de-
spite the massive array of potential art experiences. Making the call audible
requires recipients and art lovers alike to attune the imagination to the right
frequency.
Imagination. One might ask what the imagination has to do with hear-
ing the call of the Other. Sometimes recipients exhaust more energy trying to
figure out how to use their gift than givers expended deciding what to give.
Like artworks, gifts compel us to imagine their relevance. When we receive
a gift, it takes time to determine: its use, how to display/store it, how to
protect it and why it’s valuable. As Derrida observed, ‘what is given. . . rests
on the choice of an interpretation’.31 Thus, recipients decide what counts as a
gift, whereas givers don’t know unless the gift reappears. With artworks, we
similarly begin by asking ourselves why anyone would appreciate this. . . and
eventually we discover our own reasons for appreciating it, which only serve
to strengthen our fondness for the artworks. I envision this ‘gift relationship’
holding for literature, films, theatre, built environments and much more. As
we shall see, our agonistic relationships with gifts transform us, much like our
experiences with artworks that we originally rejected.
Exemplary of the imagination at play, the hazel-eyed guy suddenly realises
that wearing loden will prevent party-goers from pinching him even though
it’s not quite shamrock green. Suddenly, this forgotten, despised garment
proves purposeful. Although it was originally given to him as an alternative
to his frayed jumper, he has until now found every excuse in the book to
ignore the call of the Other. It’s obviously not the green for him, since it’s
more appropriate for hunters than vegans and doesn’t yet match anything
else he wears. To justify wearing it, he interprets it as befitting St. Patrick’s
Day, thus enlivening its givenness.
Enacting a gift is always first and foremost an act of the imagination,
because gifts selected by Others strike us differently (they tend to startle)
than those things we choose. Even gifts selected for us challenge our imag-
ination, reminding us that we are not the Other. Hénaff adds, ‘What is
given. . . testifies to the very separation between us and Others’.32 Every gift
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entails ‘the irruption of Others’ that ‘suspends the reciprocity between giving
and grasping’.33 It’s a new world, no longer the Same.34 Figuring out how to
grasp the gift at hand is difficult, but hardly impossible as Derrida claimed.
What happens next is anybody’s guess. As Jean-Luc Marion likes to say,
‘What shows itself first gives itself ’.35 To show what is given, the donee ef-
fectively tests his/her original gift-beliefs. Further affirming my claim that
enacting gifts is on par with performing artworks, Hénaff says rather explicitly,
‘Givenness belongs to the order of performative effectiveness . . . . givenness
exists only as an operation’.36 The recipient’s eventual gift enactment demon-
strates givenness and is thus an effective performance. Were it not for loden’s
negative connotations, the hazel-eyed guy would gladly wear it instead of his
tattered jumper.
Trust. Imagine another route. Try as we may, we cannot ‘hear’ the
Other’s call: no apparent interpretation makes the gift fit. It’s clear that
the giver has our best interests at heart, but we cannot fathom what those
might be. We have two more options: blindly trust the giver or seek advice
from another person whom we trust. Unlike moral deference, we are merely
seeking an alternate interpretation, not moral advice enabling us to deflect
responsibility onto others. It hardly matters who offers the interpretation,
so long as we hear the Other’s call. If an unfamiliar wine doesn’t taste so
great, one friend might suggest that we use it for cooking, while a wine expert
might provide special information, such as ‘serve it chilled’, which measurably
improves its flavour. When we cannot figure out how to evaluate the artwork
at hand, we scan the program or read the adjacent object label. In both cases,
we rely on those who have performed the artworks as shown. Our deference
may be only temporary, lasting only long enough until we get our own handle
on the artwork or it may be permanent, since we deem it the best way to
hear the call of the Other. That we willingly adopt another’s interpretation
to make an artwork meaningful or a gift relevant signals trust.
Trusting the giver helps. If the hazel-eyed guy views the giver with sus-
picion, doubt or remorse, the loden jumper will likely never see the light of
day. If he doesn’t already love it, he will probably not feel moved to try it.
The islanders who showed up to receive gifts clearly trusted the gift-bearers.
If ‘gift display’ had been interpreted as a Trojan Horse, their fear of being
ambushed would have led them to defend their island instead. Such high
levels of trust can inspire recipients to cease control, a feature common to
both gifts and artworks. Gift acceptance signals alliance as the specificity of
Self joins with the alienness of the Other. It’s as if a ‘third-party element
conjoins the two sides: There is no covenant without an ark of covenant’.37
Presumably, the donee who trusts the donor dons the sweater sooner than
later, even if sporting loden in public still leaves him feeling icky. That we
opt to take/leave gifts and then treasure/dismiss them out of hand are other
aspects that gift reception shares with art experiences. When we suddenly
appreciate artworks that we previously rejected, the artwork doubles as a gift.
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Already given, artworks are there for our grasping. As audience members, we
decide which artworks strike us as worthy of greater consideration and repeat
experiences, so art experiences reflect our capacity for trust. If we trust the
gallerist’s eye, the curator’s vision or the reviewers’ perspective, then we are
more likely to treat a ‘weak exhibition’ seriously, give it greater thought or
reconsider our initial response. I call this aesthetic trust, since we temporarily
defer to experts, whom we believe have greater insight. In trusting others, we
have considerably more satisfying experiences. By contrast, transformation
requires us to grasp the gift/artwork for ourselves, enabling us to recognise
ourselves in the gift/artwork.
On a related note, Hénaff considers gifts the opposite of contracts.38 Even
so, gifts bear witness to commitments implicit in alliances.39 Recall the is-
landers’ ceremonial gifts, whose purpose is social (builds trust), not moral
(kindness, mutual aid or solidarity).40 He credits the reply at the heart of
reciprocal gifts with sanctioning trust. I have tried to show that the gift must
be enacted to count as a gift, even if the giver never witnesses it. Showing
givenness strengthens alliances while diminishing feelings of disrespect, in-
gratitude and even self-pity. Hénaff distinguishes mutuality from reciprocity
as follows: ‘Mutuality is trust confirmed, and even trust instituted, whereas
reciprocity indicates that trust is being sought, in the process of being estab-
lished, but can still be lost’.41 That the recipient feels compelled to enact the
gift in the giver’s presence boosts trust.
Recognition. Thus far, I have developed a ‘recipient-oriented account’
that credits recipients’ recognition of the gift to either some imaginative in-
terpretation or their willingness to trust an interpretation offered by friends
or experts. One can already see that recognition is stronger than mere reply.
The hazel-eyed guy replied by shoving the jumper under his bed. Recognition
came much later when he finally accepted loden as his colour. With recog-
nition, we not only appreciate the gesture as a gift, but we face the Other
as we discover ourselves in the gift. It is one thing to occasionally wear the
jumper to St. Paddy’s parties, but it is quite another to admit that loden is
truly fitting, despite its hunting connotations. Hénaff astutely states, ‘What
is at stake is the act’, such that ‘discourse gives way to performance’.42 As
previously noted, this discourse is the interpretation that enables the gift to
be enacted, or performed. According to Marion, ‘If [givenness] makes the
given appear and sets the stage for the phenomenon –it must therefore be
understood as an act’.43 Such a view begs the question, an act for whom, the
giver or the recipient? As briefly noted, the obligatory act returns us to the
same spot, whereas spontaneous actions take us out of the circle of the Same.
I prefer ‘action’, since the word ‘act’ conveys pretend or manipulation, yet
the gift exists in real time.
Rightly or wrongly, we sometimes tender gifts to discern whether the
I is one of us. Are they real human beings or just ghosts? Is the recipient
respectful or spoiled? Is he/she curious or incurious? We even anticipate gifts
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prompting appropriate replies. Donees unwittingly test our patience. On cold
days, the frustrated donor wonders whether the donee will show up wearing
the loden jumper. Upon inquiring, the donor encounters a vehemently anti-
hunting vegan activist. Truth be told, expectations tender trouble since the
Other is not the Self. We must await the phenomenon of recognition, whereby
the recipient recognises something in the gift. Levinas demands ‘ingratitude’
from the Other since ‘gratitude would in fact be the return of the movement to
its origin’.44 Gratitude tends to refocus the gift on the giver. Each enactment
or rejection reflects our attempt to recognise ourselves in the gift’s alienness.
For Hénaff, ‘To be what we are we need to recognise what we are not’.45
Since gifts entail an irruption by the Other, recognition takes a long time.
Hénaff adds, ‘We are designated by Others; as we face them we have nothing
to ask’.46 He remarks how the face ‘is not a sign of the Other; it is the Other,
it occurs to us as such without any mediation; it addresses and compels us
even if we do not see it’.47 Moreover, ‘It is within this world of need and
through relationships other than justice that Others usually call on us; this
call is especially urgent in situations of deprivation, where it summons us to
provide the only possible reply: support and generous giving’.48 ‘Others are an
event, and as such they necessarily escape our knowledge, will and power. . . .
We are responsible for Others since only a Self can recognise Others’.49
We thus perform our gifts for ourselves. That the giver witnesses this
is a happy accident. Marion denies Derrida’s view that the donee must not
recognise it ‘as [a] gift, if the gift appears to him as such, if the present is
present to him as present, this simple recognition suffices to annul the gift’.50
Gifts stand out, precisely because gift acceptance indicates that we have faced
the irruption of the Other. For Hénaff, ‘this otherness alone pulls our gaze,
knowledge and desire away from the circularity of the given world, giving rise
in it to the unrepresentable figure that gives it to us’.51 Although Marion
claims that ‘the staging of the phenomenon is played out as the handing
over of a gift’, the staging rather begins with our reply, since the handing
over promises a gift, but doesn’t necessarily deliver.52 Sans audience, the
play whose curtains open to reveal an elaborate stage full of giddy actors is
rather a rehearsal. Our eventual transformation ties the agonistic gift to the
otherwise inaudible call of the Other.
Transformation. Like artworks, the gift introduces an element of exteri-
ority that inevitably transgresses Kant’s circular reciprocity. Levinas consid-
ers reciprocity problematic, not only because it’s circular, but its circulation
is closed so long as ‘Needs open onto a world that is for me –it returns to
itself [. . . ]. Need is return itself’.53 Problematically, this self-sufficient world
secures happiness ‘within the bounds of positive knowledge, fulfilled utilities
and human relationships ruled by justice. It constitutes a totality, what Lev-
inas calls the Same’.54 Initiated by exterior elements (outside the I), the gift’s
consequences are never the Same, which is why gifts rarely secure immediate
happiness. In letting the gift in, the Self undergoes a transformation.
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For Levinas, ‘The given is not ourselves. The ego possesses the given,
but is not overwhelmed by that possession and keeps a distance from the
object, an attitude of reserve, which is what distinguishes an intention from
an enjoyment. The possession of a distance, keeping one’s hands free, is what
constitutes an intentionality of an intention’.55 Gifts thus compel the Self out
of the Same, this self-sufficient world where everything we want and need is
already available. In the gift-world, ‘the Self moves towards the other’, forcing
us to face the Other, while finding uses for things that others anticipate we
want, which requires adaption to spawn desires. Hénaff considers the ‘good’
‘the power that tears us away from the immanence of being’.56 ‘Goodness in
the subject is anarchy itself’.57
As should be clear by now, ‘[m]eaning is a direction. . . it signals a move-
ment towards elsewhere’.58 ‘This agonistic face-to-face, opens the way to
plural mutuality. . . a plurality that begins with two parties, and then extends
to several’.59 For these reasons, ‘symmetry is impossible, because Others
come to us from an elsewhere that both escapes us and grabs us. Our nec-
essarily dissymmetrical relationship with Others proceeds directly from their
radical otherness. The movement that leads Us to Others is nonreversible; it
is entirely incomparable to the movement that leads Others to Us’.60
A relationship constitutes a convention.61 ‘[E]very encounter or social re-
lationship presupposes the act of reciprocal recognition, and designates every
human to every other as a being that must be considered in his/her dignity
and respected unconditionally’.62 For Hénaff, the ceremonial gift is not foun-
dational, but it reveals society’s foundations. This engenders several spheres
of recognition: institutional, social and personal that facilitate self-respect in
legal order, self-esteem in ethical life and self-confidence in love and friend-
ship.63 He observes how ‘the recognition gained in one sphere can provide the
basis of a self-esteem that can make it possible for us to succeed in another
sphere’.64 Our practices in common prove foundational for ‘trust, respect
[and] mutual recognition of the dignity of the other’.65 ‘More radically still,
this generosity generates gestures of recognition of and respect for every hu-
man being without any distinction’, recalling Levinas’s face of the Other that
‘addresses us –anyone, anywhere, whenever we experience our first encounter
with another human being’.66
Memory. Considering the recipient’s transformation at the hands of the
gift, gifts primarily serve as the ‘memory of the bonds they carry’, not fi-
nancial gains (labourers’ skills/time and rare stones/shells).67 The saying
‘to forgive is to forget’ reflects a ‘giver-oriented’ account, such that offenders
insist on forgetting. On a similar note, gift-recipients are unlikely to forget
their having faced the irruption of the other. In light of agonistic gifts, recip-
ients likely counter ‘to forgive is to remember’. Although Mauss claimed that
‘What is given is always oneself’, it’s now clear that recipients give no less of
themselves.68 Gifts register historic transformations, two-way relationships
that are more tussles than exchanges, requiring both parties to give of them-
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selves. If a mutual alliance develops, the gift procures unspoken advice and
loyalty via gestures primed to spark recollection of the recognition process.
Thus far, I’ve mentioned numerous similarities between experiencing art-
works and receiving gifts, including the way artists/givers take risks, art-
works/gifts compel spectators/recipients to enact/ignore them and specta-
tors/recipients undergo transformations (or not)). It should come as no sur-
prise that I made a similar claim in my first published philosophy paper
‘Beauty as Duty’ , ‘Viewing beautiful art could be analogous to receiving a
gift’.69 Continuing, ‘Intent on framing beauty in terms devoid of gaze aesthet-
ics, it seem[s] plausible to conclude that whenever an artist acts from duty
(in a Kantian sense), the viewer is the beneficiary of the artist’s generosity.
Kantian duty requires each person to act as one wished everyone to act, irre-
spective of any payoff’.70 In appreciating artists’ efforts, ‘the viewer has also
demonstrated an unintentional generosity’.71
III. HOW GIFTS IMPROVE SELF-KNOWLEDGE
As noted at this paper’s onset, the gift’s capacity to challenge self-knowledge
and thus transform recipient’s beliefs is what ultimately interests me. The
giver’s gift is predicated on the assumption that the recipient is rational,
such that any rational person ought to want it, irrespective of the recipient’s
wishes. In such cases, the giver believes the recipient would immediately
access this something if he/she could, so the fact that this something is being
offered for free makes it the perfect gift. Because gifts are destined for singular
recipients, any notion of ‘rational’ cannot be general (as in ‘any rational
actor’), but is rather particular, as in ‘rational given this particular context’.
Since self-knowledge is predicated on rationality, philosophers typically see
no reason to doubt people’s claims about their feelings, beliefs, desires and
attitudes, since the latter ‘are responsive to reasons, to changes in what you
have reason to believe, and that is why they are as they rationally ought to
be’.72 To ascertain our beliefs about so and so, we simply ask ourselves what
we think about so and so.73 Quassim Cassam terms this the ‘Transparency
Method’ (TM). He distinguishes homo philosophicus as human beings whose
attitudes are ‘as they rationally ought to be’ from homo sapiens, we ‘ordinary
humans’ who suffer self-ignorance when our attitudes are either irrational or
inaccessible.74 Ever since Pausanias identified the inscription ‘Know Thyself’
on the pronaos of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi, philosophers have imagined
homo philosophicus using TM to access beliefs, fears and desires. This image
of self-knowledge as being there for the taking (direct via TM), characterises
self-knowledge as already given like gifts and artworks.
As Cassam remarks, ‘TM is tailor made for homo philosophicus’, which
may explain why so few philosophers, save perhaps Friedrich Nietzsche and
more recently Eric Schwitzgebel, have bothered to challenge TM’s accuracy.75
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Unlike Nietzsche who claimed that ‘we are necessarily strangers to ourselves’,
Cassam doesn’t consider self-knowledge prima facie impossible, even though
a degree of self-ignorance is normal.76
The prevalence among humans of the factors that cause us to be self-
ignorant is, at least to some extent, an empirical matter. It’s an empirical
question how prone we are to misinterpreting the behaviourial and psycho-
logical evidence for our own attitudes, or to what extent we are capable of
avoiding various kinds of bias in thinking about our own characters. No doubt
there are psychological studies that bear on these questions, but you don’t
have to have read these studies to realise that the cognitive vices which lead
to self-ignorance are far from rare or unusual; reading great novels and talking
to your friends would do just as well.77
Cassam considers the difference between trivial self-knowledge (TSK),
such that one believes it will rain, from the slower substantial self-knowledge
(SSK), which includes knowledge of our character, values, abilities, aptitudes,
reasons, emotions and what makes us happy a matter of degree.78 As it
turns out, SSK is the kind of thing that matters more to ordinary humans,
but it poses obstacles, since we are, after all, allzumenschliches.79 Cassam
worries that philosophers’ assumption that self-knowledge is both direct and
authoritative (belief-holder access accords legitimacy) has led them to focus
on TSK at the expense of SSK, leaving self-knowledge vulnerable to factual
error, repression, bias, self-deception, self-conception, challenges, incorrigibil-
ity, non-transparency, counter-evidence, lack of reflection, indirectness, and
value incoherence, all of which he discusses in great detail in Chapter 3. For
our purposes, ‘The Corrigibility Condition’ such that ‘you may not be in
the best position to know about such matters and others might know better;
your spouse may well have a much deeper insight into your character than
you do’ proves most relevant.80 Upon hearing why the hazel-eyed guy abhors
‘brownish greens’, the giver could have proposed returning his eye-popping
jumper in order to offer it to someone else who needs it. Since the gift was
not retracted, the donor must have good reason to believe that his views are
likely to change.
Even if accessing SSK proves difficult and few recipients share homo philo-
sophicus’ access, TSK is surely relevant, since our reply wholly depends on our
immediate access to our preferences. So long as donees are not anti-hunting
vegan activists, they’re unlikely to shun loden. If agonistic gifts by definition
take us out of the Same, then the recipient who wears the jumper without re-
flecting upon its connotations acquires the garment for free, yet stays within
the circle. If the gift’s transformative powers rest on its agonistic relationship,
then TSK sets the gift in motion, whereas enacting the gift, which facilitates
transformation, engenders SSK. It is important that we take a stand, even if
our actions show us (and others) that we are effectively clueless. It is only
by enacting the gift that we gain access to SSK, since doing so triggers our
access to the very obstacles blocking our access to SSK. Although Cassam
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never mentions gifts in Self-Knowledge for Humans , he does discuss the role
of evidence, in particular how our actions provide evidence for our beliefs,
which influences other people’s assessments of us. And this disconnect be-
tween what we think we believe and how we act lets others feel confident that
they know us in ways that we don’t. To be clear, my point is not that other
people know us better than we know ourselves, but that gifts help us access
SSK. Furthermore, our initial reply reflects our tendency to privilege TSK at
the expense of SSK, otherwise we would thoughtfully respond, ‘I’ll think on
it’ when presented with ‘unwanted’ gifts. But in fact, we rarely question our
decisions to reject/ignore gifts. Although we rarely go so far as to outright
decline them, we’re ultimately surprised when we end up valuing things that
originally struck as ‘meh!’ or ‘Oh boy!’.
When Kevin Melchionne published his clever paper ‘On the Old Saw “I
Know Nothing About Art but I Know What I Like”’, he upended this ‘old
saw’ as it pertains to what we deem our aesthetic preferences.81 Citing psy-
chological evidence, he explains that when human beings are asked to give
reasons for their particular selections, they actually become confused, and
sometimes realise that their aesthetic preferences have either changed or are
far more malleable than previously thought. Melchionne offers the ‘fallibil-
ity of reasons’ to explain why people’s choices change as their reasons to
believe shift. Philosophers who uphold homo philosophicus have tended to
attribute such shifting to irrational behaviour. As Cassam states, ‘Acknowl-
edging the Disparity [between actions and reasons] isn’t about convicting us
of irrationality but of trying to be realistic about how we reason and come
to know ourselves’.82 To my lights, the ‘old saw’ exemplifies our faith in TM,
even though we value aesthetic experiences because they trigger our access
to SSK. The unexpected nature of gifts offers an even greater potential to
upend preferences.
In light of behavioural economics’ research, we recognise that rational
creatures don’t necessarily change their attitudes when faced with new evi-
dence. Until recently, however, philosophers considered rationality relational
to thoughts and behaviours, such that people are moved by reasons. Thomas
Scanlon’s What We Owe to Each Other attributes his narrow account of ir-
rationality to inconsistency, rather than mistaken beliefs. He summarises,
‘When a rational creature judges that a certain attitude is war-
ranted, she generally comes to have this attitude, and “when a
rational creature judges that the reasons she is aware of count
decisively against a certain attitude, she generally does not have
that attitude, or ceases to have it if she did so before”’.83
It becomes clear that the gift’s presence, our initial reply and our repeat
efforts to enact it generate new reasons to reassess extant beliefs.
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Cassam considers rationality a systemic matter, since it connects ‘aspects
of the person’s thoughts and behaviour. And what makes it intelligible that
“rational creatures are sometimes irrational” is the fact that these connections
need not hold in every case’.84 The giver who doesn’t insist on the unworn
jumper’s return presumes rationality given the obvious need for a new one.
That the donee grows to love his loden jumper hardly means that he is irra-
tional. His judgement-sensitive attitudes have changed. First, it fit the St.
Patrick’s Day party, during which he received complements. Then he realised
that loden signals ‘leafy greens’ as much as it does hunting. Those who fail
to realise that the evidence for p has been discredited open themselves up
to rational criticism, even though continuing to believe that p doesn’t prove
irrationality.85 Perhaps the hazel-eyed guy was boorish: his gift-rejection
reflected some combination of belief-perseverance (beliefs persevere despite
contrary evidence) and confirmation bias (believer seeks evidence that sus-
tains prior beliefs). Beliefs are like habits: they’re difficult to change If we
don’t like the gift, it’s unreasonable to regularly try it on to see whether our
minds have changed.86 Obstacles to reception are a lot like obstacles to SSK
(repression, self-deception, not worth overcoming).
With gifts, the ‘what’ is already present, leaving reasons for/against (or
why) in question. Enacting new gifts is comparable to adopting new beliefs.
We generate reasons, what I earlier termed interpretations, to incorporate
gifts into our lives. If our reasons don’t fit the gift, we need new ones. What
interests me is the way gifts offer us opportunities to test-drive new beliefs,
which help us eliminate obstacles to self-knowledge. Otherwise, we hold on to
beliefs the way we do clothes that occupy our closets, but never our bodies.
IV. HOW GIFTS REFUTE DENNETT’S SIMILARITY
THESIS
Despite the obvious disparities that exist between homo philosophicus and
homo sapiens, Daniel Dennett proposed the Similarity Thesis, which rec-
ommends that ‘we approach each other as what he calls “intentional sys-
tems”; that is, as entities whose behavior can be predicted by the method of
attributing beliefs, desires, and rational acumen according to the following
principles’:1)‘a system’s beliefs are those it ought to have, given its perceptual
capacities, its epistemic needs, and its biography’, 2) ‘A system’s desires are
those it ought to have, given its biological needs and the most practical means
of satisfying them’ and 3) ‘A system’s behavior will consist of those acts it
could be rational for an agent with those beliefs and desires to perform’.87
This all seems well and good until we consider gift-giving, which involves two
parties assessing the other and themselves despite inadequate information.
As Cassam points out, ‘We ascribe beliefs and desires to give reason-giving
explanations of actions, and beliefs and desires can themselves be given ratio-
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nal explanations; we make it intelligible that S believes that P by explaining
why S ought to believe that P in these circumstances’.88 We can explain the
hazel-eyed guy’s reply, but it remains unpredictable.
Dennett’s version of the Similarity Thesis suggests that even if we’re not
ideal epistemic and connotative agents we ‘approximate to the ideal version of
ourselves exploited to yield predictions’.89 That is, we attribute rationality to
what homo philosophicus ought to believe or desire. Cassam terms this Inter-
pretationism since its truth depends on our interpretation of what the subject
believes or desires, which is based on some optimal agreement between what
the subject believes and what he/she ought to believe, his/her other attitudes
and the available evidence.90 Notice that Dennett’s emphasizing some inter-
pretation, rationality and ‘evidence’ seems ‘implicitly inferential’ like TSK.91
Gifts demonstrate the way gift-attitudes are more moving targets than ‘inten-
tional systems’. As contexts change, so do our beliefs and desires about them.
That the hazel-eyed guy offers clear reasons for avoiding loden, which he later
wears hardly makes him irrational. That the giver is in no better position
to predict recipient responses poses a challenge to views like Dennett’s that
presuppose the ease of treating people like ‘intentional systems’.
In the end, we don’t actually ascribe beliefs because they are what others
ought rationally to believe. Moreover, thoughts of rational beliefs don’t do
the explanatory work. For example, the giver failed to consider the hazel-
eyed guy an avid anti-hunting vegan. When ascribing beliefs, there are non-
rational factors such as the bias to believe, attractions of conspiracy theories,
prevalence of belief-perseverance and attitude-recalcitrance.92 Intelligibility
doesn’t depend on rationality. Moreover, the ‘argument from above’ doesn’t
eliminate the disparity between ideal and actual actors.93 In fact, Cassam
rates the argument from above as weaker than Psychological Rationalism,
since its ideal epistemic agents remain approximations.94 ‘[I]f the principles
of rationality are substantial enough to rule out the Disparity then it’s im-
plausible that they structure and organise our attributions of belief and desire
to each other. . . . [I]f Dennett’s principles structure and organise our attribu-
tions of attitudes to each other then they can’t be substantial enough to rule
out the Disparity’.95 For these reasons, impasses arise from the moment the
recipient takes gift in hand.
V. A FINAL APPROACH
Activism makes self-knowledge a species of what we sometimes call maker’s
knowledge, which is ‘the knowledge you have of what you yourself make’.96
You come to know what you believe by coming to know what you ought to
believe. For Cassam, the ‘Activist’s Proposal’ is such that in coming to de-
termine that we ought rationally to believe, we epistemically determine that
we believe that p, and thereby constitutively determine that we believe that
p. We are active, we reason ourselves ‘into believing or wanting something,
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and it certainly isn’t correct in these cases to say that [we] are a mere passive
observer of [our] attitudes’.97 If all beliefs required deliberation or reasoning,
we would have fewer beliefs. ‘Neither the belief nor knowledge of B is a prod-
uct of deliberation’.98 Beliefs are retrieved not formed. Moreover, ‘nothing
that is recognisable as a belief can be totally insulated from the engagement
of one’s rational capacities, but the question is whether the sense in which
we are “active” in relation to our stored or perceptual beliefs casts any light
on how we know them’.99 In light of new evidence, beliefs are revised sub-
personally, ‘rather than by me, the subject of the belief’.100 Activism entails
two types of activities- attitudes formed as acts of deliberation and those that
are sensitive to our reasoning. For these reasons, we appreciate agonistic gifts







5I specifically chose the colour ‘loden’
since it looks amazing on people with hazel
eyes, plus it elicits diverse connotations.
Given its origin in the Tyrolean Alps, I
must admit, however, that I felt a bit
self-conscious when I presented this paper


































































































99Cassam 2014, p. 114.
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